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In this paper I propose two genuine philosophical approaches to action and I compare the different 
positions about this topic. I attempt to show that Heidegger’s elaboration about the “worldlessness 
of world”, about “poverty in world of animal” and about the “world-formation of Dasein” can 
bring to mind Gallagher&Zahavi’s distinction about “oriented-towards-something movements”, 
“action”, and “action with sense of agency”. In this sense I try to reflect about act, action, agent 
and about the agent’s awareness to be an agent towards a phenomenology of action, towards a 
phenomenological clarification of our experience. In the first part I propose some philosophical 
elements about phenomenology of action showing how it is difficult to identify two or more 
experiences “as the same experiences”. In the second part I recall very briefly the main line of 
Gallagher&Zahavi perspective that we can find principally in “The Phenomenological Mind” where 
they try to explain the different aspects of movement and action proposing some reflections about 
agency. In the third part I expose Heidegger’s position that we can find in the “The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics”. In the fourth part, I present the synergetic attempt of comparison 
between Heidegger thought and Gallagher&Zahavi perspective.
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In this paper I compare Gallagher&Zahavi perspective and Heidegger 
position in order to present a genuinely philosophical phenomenology of action. 
Introducing my speech I want to underline some phenomenological elements 
that can point out my considerations. Quoting The Phenomenological Mind: 
To put it differently, our primary way of encountering worldly entities is by 
using them rather than by theorizing about them or perceiving them in a 
detached manner.
In this way, as Whitehead did, I can affirm that we are where we are able to 
produce effects. A “simple thing” is not simply a “thing among the others things”: 
it is handling, it is ready-to-hand because we take care of things. What can we say 
about the role of experience? How can we distinguish phenomenologically the 
experience that is usually the natural attitude of cognitives science consider 
superimposable? How can we phenomenologically argue about it? The natural 
attitude asserts that there is a neutral view capable of showing the “real 
things”, without the mutable outcomes of the first-person perspective. On the 
contrary Gallagher&Zahavi say:
Some people mistake phenomenology for a subjective account of experience; 
but a subjective account of experience should be distinguished from an account 
of subjective experience. In a similar way, some people confuse an objective 
account of experience with the idea that we can understand subjective 
experience by turning it into an object that can be examined using third-person 
methods.
So, there is not any pure third-personal perspective as there is not a “view 
from nowhere”. Phenomenologically it is very hard to identify two or more 
experiences as the same experiences. It is very doubtful to argue that “a, b, c” 
are the same actions observed from different positions. Quoting Gallagher: 
Despite the similarity and perhaps the identity of the actions at the motor level, 
however, these are two different actions at the level of intentions. (Gallagher, in press) 
A phenomenology of actions has to explain how we can observe the same common 
elements at the motor level (or neurological level) but at the same time we 
understand a difference of meaning. So, how can we explain that the same action is 
not equivalent? The answer has to be found in the phenomenological perspective 
of action and in the intentional givenness of consciousness: the different 
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intentional givens (remembered, regretted, judged) can take root in the common 
physical elements (the body movement, the airplane landing): in this way a non-
phenomenological view mistakes the experience and unifies the givens. On the 
contrary, a phenomenology of action tries to underline the common physical 
elements, (that is “mechanical” or “motor” elements), of different intentional 
givens. Only with a phenomenological analysis of action we can argue meaningly 
about our experiences and go beyond the ingenuous prejudice of natural attitude.
I want to recall very briefly the main line of Gallagher&Zahavi perspective 
that we can find in The Phenomenological Mind and in particular way in the 
chapter titled “Action and agency”.
The philosophers try to explain the different aspects of move and act proposing 
the distinction between movements and actions. A phenomenological attitude 
asks to attend to the world strictly as it appears; a phenomenological 
perspective about action problem involves a reflective approach about first-
order and high-order experience. I quote The Phenomenological Mind: 
For a movement to be an action it has to be goal-directed and intentional. A 
movement that is a reflex, or passive, or subintentional, or preintentional is not 
an action, although it might be interpreted as an action from the outside, that 
is, by some other person.
Quoting again The Phenomenological Mind:
What makes a movement intentional? What makes it an action? What does 
it mean to have an intention to act? We said: all intentional movements – all 
actions – are goal directed. So to have an intention to act means that we have 
some kind of goal in mind.
In this book we can find some interesting examples that could clarify the subject: 
the example of the handgun, the friend’s visit that obliges me to stand up in order 
to open the door, the example of the dress. These examples show how we can 
distinguish the different kinds of movements that can be discerned in the range 
between reflex movement and intentional action. In other words: there is a distinction 
between movement and action, but it is not always simple to consider the broad 
range between reflex movement and intentional action. Another very important 
element in the research about phenomenology of act is the concept of agency and 
the connected notion of sense of agency1. In a general way, I can say that the sense 
1. 
The Gallagher&Zahavi 
phenomenological 
perspective
1 It is possible to discern agency from sense of agency considering some neuropathological 
disorder. Cfr. Pacherie et al. 2005. 
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of agency is the experience that I am the one who is causing or generating the action. 
Nonetheless several theories and brain-imaging experiments show that there is not 
consensus about how to define the sense of agency. 
Quoting Gallagher: 
In some cases the sense of agency is construed in terms of bodily movement or 
motor control, in others it is linked to the intentional aspect of action. For some 
theorists it is the product of higher-order cognitive processes, for others it is a 
feature of first-order phenomenal experience.
However, beyond the doubts and the multiple perspectives that the philosophers can 
engage, I want to return to The Phenomenological Mind analysis; in this way I quote:
In its proper sense, we understand agency to depend on the agent’s consciousness 
of agency. That is, if someone intentionally causes something to happen, that 
person is not an agent (even if they are a cause) if they do not know that they 
have intentionally caused it to happen.
In other words, if someone or some animals causes something to happen, that person 
or animal is not the agent if they do not know in some way that they have caused it to 
happen. So, if an action is something goal-directed and with an intentional reference 
then someone has agency when he knows to be the agent of the action. The main 
point of the argumentation is this one: we can phenomenologically describe an action 
without sense of agency, namely an action without the agent’s awareness to be an agent. 
In the Gallagher&Zahavi perspective an action can be realized by an actor that has not 
awareness to be the actor, even if this actor has carried out the action following an 
aim and involving an intentional reference. 
In summary, in Gallagher&Zahavi perspective about phenomenology of act I 
can emphasize three levels of experience: 
• the oriented-towards-something character (for example, a hurricane);
• the action (differently from movement, an action is intentional and goal-
directed but the agent can be not-aware to be the agent of the action);
• the action with sense of agency (the agent is aware to be the agent of the 
action).      
We can extrapolate some very interesting analysis about phenomenology of action in 
the Heidegger reflexion (Heidegger 1983). In fact we can find three theses about 
the relationship with the world: the first one affirms that the stone is worldless; the 
second one that the animal is poor in world and the last one that the man is world-
forming. I argue that these theses involve three levels of experience concerning a 
phenomenology of action, and I compare them with Gallagher&Zahavi results. 
2. Heidegger’s 
considerations 
towards a 
phenomenology 
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Quoting Heidegger it is possible to make some considerations about 
worldlessness of stone: 
The stone is without world. The stone is lying on the path, for example. We can 
say that the stone is exerting a certain pressure upon the surface of the earth. It is 
‘touching’ the earth. But what we call ‘touching’ here is not a form of touching at 
all in the stronger sense of the word. It is not at all like that relationship which the 
lizard has to the stone on which it lies basking in the sun. And touching implied 
in both these cases is above all not the same as that touch which we experience 
when we rest our hand upon the head of another human being. The lying upon..., 
the touching involved in our three examples is fundamental different in each case.
Indeed we can say that the stone lies upon the earth, but does not touch it. If 
we throw the stone into the river, then it will lie wherever it falls. The stone 
follows the circumstances, crops up here or there, amongst and amidst a host 
of other things; nevertheless everything around the stone remains essentially 
inaccessible to the stone itself. The stone is worldless: it signifies that the 
worldlessness can be characterized as not having access to beings. The stone 
lies on the path, it rests on the path without being aware of lying on the path 
and without intending to lie on the path. 
Concerning the poorness of animal Heidegger says: 
The lizard basking in the sun on its warm stone does not merely crop up in the world. 
It has sought out this stone and is accustomed to doing so. If we now remove the lizard 
from its stone, it does not simply lie wherever we have put it but starts looking for its 
stone again, irrespective of whether or not it actually finds it. The lizard basks in the 
sun. At least this is how we describe what it is doing, although it is doubtful whether it 
really comports itself in the same way as we do when we lie out in the sun, i.e, whether 
the sun is accessible to it as sun, whether the lizard is capable of experiencing the rock 
as rock. Yet the lizard’s relation to the sun and to warmth is different from that of the 
warm stone simply lying present at hand in the sun. 
It is true – and Heidegger exposes it very clearly – that the lizard cannot 
propose a “mineralogical analysis” about rocks; then, the sun where the rock 
is warming is not given for the lizard as sun; at the same time we cannot 
say that the lizard is amongst other material things (the rock, the bush etc.). 
Heidegger suggests that what we identify as the rock and the sun are just 
lizard-things for the lizard. When we expose the example about the lizard lying 
on the rock, we ought to cross out the word “rock” in order to indicate that 
whatever the lizard is lying on is certainly given in some way for the lizard, 
nevertheless the lizard does not know the rock as rock. The dealing with the 
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world of the lizard is not simply a lying on the rock: the lizard is not put on 
the rock in the same way the stone is put on the path, because if someone 
moves it far from the rock the lizard will try to reach the warm rock again. 
In this way the lizard is not simply subsisting nearby the rock and amongst 
the other things but it has a special relation with the rock, with the sun and 
with all the material things. The presentation of the third thesis has to be 
connected with the clarification of the notion of “world”. I can underline four 
principal steps in this Heidegger’s argumentation about this concept: firstly, 
he naively considers the world as the totality of beings; then as “accessibility 
of beings”, successively as the “accessibility of beings as such” and finally he 
speaks about the world as “the manifestness of beings as such as a whole”. 
The thesis about the man world-formation allows to open the perspective 
towards the last section of Heidegger phenomenology of action and explains 
the “manifestness of beings as such as a whole”. I propose a consideration 
about this topic: the accessibility of beings as such is the specific structure 
of the “metaphysic practice”. Indeed the peculiarity of metaphysic action 
is the possibility to be in relation and to be positioned face to face with the 
beings as such. An example can clarify the topic; the cat could be interested 
in the mouse or desire to catch it and then eat it. The cat observes the mouse 
only inside a practical situation, only inside a situation of (its) life. Contrary 
the man could have another different experience: he can fear the mouse, he 
can be worried about its presence but he can also think about the mouse as 
such, independently and separately from every practical connection. The 
reifying practice of metaphysic human language brings us to see, to observe, 
to deal with things as things, thing as such. Contrarily the animal can only be 
inserted in a practical situation with (a lot of) things: properly we cannot 
say that the cat looks for “the mouse”, but we have to show how the cat is 
behaving with respect to the mouse; the mouse for the cat is not “a mouse” but 
it is “cat-food”, “cat-enemy-to-hunt”. In fact, the last step in Heidegger’s 
argumentation tries to explain that the world – for the Dasein – is not a 
manifestness of just any kind whatsoever, but rather manifestness of beings as 
such as a whole; therefore “as a whole” signifies “in the form of the whole”. I 
can conclude quoting Heidegger again: 
We shall now describe the site of the problem in a preliminary fashion by 
explaining in general what we mean by world-formation. According to our 
thesis, world belongs to world-formation. [...] For it is not the case that man 
first exists and then also one day decides amongst other things to form a world. 
Rather world-formation is something that occurs, and only on this ground can a 
human being exist in the first place. Man as man is world-forming. 
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I have been obliged to limit my considerations in this paper. Heidegger 
analysis permits us to pose the guiding-problem of acting from a different 
perspective. Now it is the time to propose the comparison between Heidegger 
perspective and Gallagher&Zahavi position. 
Considering the analysis suggested in this paper, it appears lawful to propose 
a comparison between Heidegger perspective and Gallagher&Zahavi position 
that we can find in The Phenomenological Mind. This attempt conducts us to 
outline a genuine phenomenology of action that tries to distinguish three 
different degrees of experience involving three parallelisms: the worldlessness 
of the stone in Heidegger perspective could be connected with the oriented-
towards-something character of experience which Gallagher&Zahavi speak of; the 
animal’s poverty in world (behaviour) with the notion of action; lastly, the man’s 
world-formation (comportment) with the action with sense of agency.
GALLAGHER&ZAHAVI HEIDEGGER
“Oriented-towards-something 
character”
Action
Action with Sense of Agency
Worldlessness of the stone 
Poverty in World of Animal 
(Behaviour)
Man’s World-Formation 
(Comportment)
A
B
C
3. 
A synergetic attempt 
to propose a genuinely 
phenomenology of 
action: a comparison 
between Heidegger’s 
thought and 
Gallagher&Zahavi’ s 
perspective
A) In Gallagher&Zahavi’s perspective I can distinguish different kinds of 
“movements-displacements” that I cannot name “actions” even if they are 
directed to something and even if they produce some consequences. The 
philosophers speak about a hurricane: it surely causes some modifications 
on the earth; it operates on the trees and on the plants (oriented-towards-
something character) but it does not act in respect to trees and plants.
Heidegger speaks about worldlessness of the stone: he explains how a stone, 
a tree or a leaf lies on the path. They are directed-towards-something (the 
path) but they cannot be aware of it and they cannot try to reach it: the 
stone cannot strive to lie in the river, it falls into the river. For this reason 
its “touching” the path is essentially different from the animal or human 
experience of “touching”. 
B) In The Phenomenological Mind the philosophers speak about a particular 
kind of action completed by an agent even if he is not aware to be the agent 
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of that action. They call it an action without sense of agency for the agent. In 
this sense there is a real intentional reference inserted in a finalistic purpose, 
even if there is not explicit awareness of these elements. When I get up to 
open the door because my friend is arriving, I flex my legs and I grasp the 
arms of the chair (to get up) without awareness of this specific act (even if I 
am aware of the final goal: to go to the door and open it); so this is an action 
(because it is goal-directed and intentional) but I do not have awareness to be 
the agent of this action.
Heidegger positions seem more structured: the animal is the living being 
properly characterized by a have and does not have world (the animal is poor in 
world): an animal has the accessibility to the beings in an intentional manner 
(the dog making for the steak) and it is guided by aims (the dog wants to eat 
the steak), but at the same time it does not know the steak as such, it sees 
and it wants the steak as dog-nourishment. Briefly: while it is certain that all 
instinctual behaviour is a “relating to...”, it is just as surely the case that in 
all its behaviors the animal is incapable of ever properly attending to something 
as such. The dog makes some actions but it is not aware of being the agent of 
these actions, so it does not have the sense of agency.
C) In Gallagher&Zahavi perspective, the high-order phenomenal experience 
appears limited to human activity: differently from the first-order experience 
that can involve non-conscious and sub-personal processes, the human 
high-order experience presents to us an intentional horizon structure in the 
sense that it “aims at” or “intends” something beyond itself; furthermore 
it is goal-directed and the awareness about these elements is called agency. 
Stricto sensu, we can speak about action only for the human experience that is 
an intentional and goal-directed experience acted by an agent aware of being 
the agent of this action. 
In Heidegger perspective – coherently with a typical metaphysic theoretical 
prejudice – only the Dasein is world-forming, and he is separated from the 
other beings from an absolute oppositional limit. Man is the only being that can 
have the access to a thing as thing, to a thing as such. This typical and exclusive 
human openness permits to the Dasein to see the things as such: the man is the 
only animal that can see, use and deal with things as things.
I think that the comparison between these three levels of experience 
in Heidegger perspective and in Gallagher&Zahavi position is definitely 
convincing. We have to clarify how some apparently equivalent movements 
(at the level of sensory-motor processes and body schematic processes) 
are phenomenologically different. Proposing an attitudinal change we 
have to diverge from a reductive materialism and we have to return to the 
4.
Some conclusive 
considerations:
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things themselves in order to attend to the world strictly as it appears. If we 
want to clarify our experiences we have to reflectively dwell and refrain 
from naturalistic approaches; following this way, I want to propose some 
conclusive considerations. In the analysis suggested, it clearly appears the 
attempt to explain and to discern the difficulties connected to the role of 
action and the agent’s awareness to be an agent. So in this perspective I have 
tried to present an attempt of phenomenological reflection about acting 
forward an outline of a phenomenology of action. What I have sought to do, 
it is not a rereading of The Phenomenological Mind by means of the Heidegger 
perspective or vice versa. Rather, I have researched for a phenomenology 
of action as the attempt to return retrospectively to the phenomena of 
our experiences as they appear, showing the genesis of our beliefs and 
biases. Nevertheless, there are, obviously, some aspects that would be 
more attentively researched. I can briefly remember some open-ended 
considerations : 
• Developing Heidegger perspective, it seems that also man 
sometimes acts in the same way as an animal: sometimes man acts 
without sense of agency, that is he acts without considering the 
typically human openness to beings as beings. This explication allows us 
to give light to some controversial human experiences and it gives a 
plausible explanation to the question about the action without sense of 
agency, which Gallagher&Zahavi write about.
• In opposition to Heidegger, Derrida tries to show how animals – like 
men – can suffer; this element would cancel the supposed structural 
difference between humans and what-the-humans-call-animals. It is very 
clear in Heidegger perspective the purpose to manifest the human 
superiority, coherently with his metaphysic commitment: we can say 
that the “animalist care” does not worry Heidegger simply because it 
was not an element of his discussion. Nevertheless, the Derrida position 
is more complex but – I think – not resolutive.
• At last – properly – Heidegger does not speak about “action” 
and he does not use the expression “phenomenology of action”. 
Nevertheless, I am convinced that Heidegger ontical analysis about 
“world” can be connected with the Gallagher&Zahavi perspective about 
action. Obviously, it would be necessary to ask why Heidegger does not 
approach directly a phenomenology of action. We can hypothesize to find 
the answer in the ontological field.
Concluding my paper, I would like to stress that further research would 
obviously be needed. My purpose was very simple: proposing two genuine 
phenomenological approaches to action and compare the different positions 
about this topic, trying to connect the elements and suggesting some 
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conclusions. I think that Heidegger elaboration about the worldlessness of 
world, about poverty in world of animal and about the world-formation of Dasein 
can bring to mind Gallagher&Zahavi distinction about oriented-towards-
something movements, action, and action with sense of agency. In this sense I have 
tried to reflect about act, action, agent and about the agent’s awareness to be 
an agent towards a phenomenology of action, towards a phenomenological 
clarification of our experience.
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